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Introduction 
Although the term "miracle" has gained acceptance to describe the 
Japanese ascent to its present position in the world economy it can hardly 
be considered a scientific category.' It will be recalled in this connection 
that even an esteemed sociologist as Max Weber originally expressed 
doubts as to the prospects of capitalism in Japan. Nevertheless, in the 
course of little more than one century that country has become a leading 
capitalist nation; in economic terms second only to the United States. 
This "Great Leap Forward has shaken conventional wisdom as to socie- 
tal development. While Western governments are presently looking for 
ways of restraining Japanese successes in international trade, on the aca- 
demic level the process has turned Japan into a challenge: Economics, po- 
litical science, anthropology, etc. -all have been mobilized to deal with this 
problematique. They offer valuable, if partial, explanations to the basic 
question of how it was possible for a country not belonging to the Euro- 
pean cultural tradition to accomplish such a feat.2 
Understanding the internal background is, of course, of primordial im- 
portance in conceptualizing the country's trajectory. Nevertheless, the ar- 
gument can be made that a paramount factor allowing the domestic 
process to unfold was exceptional geopolitical circumstances. Indeed, ex- 
traordinary external conditions characterized Japan's situation from the 
very beginning of the West's intrusion into Asia. Compared to other na- 
tions of the area, Japan was given the historical opportunity to bring about 
an internal mobilization which allowed the country to escape the fate of 
direct or indirect colonialism. The reasons for this were numerous but 
related. Awareness of the dialectical relationship between the internal and 
the external elements behind Japan's transition to a modern nation-state 
has been a component of the Marxist or proto-Marxist t r ad i t i~n .~  In more 
recent time, any discussion of the transformation of defeated Japan into 
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an economic superpower in the course of some thirty-five years or less re- 
mains incomplete unless the external dimension is taken into considera- 
tion. 
In this paper, an attempt will be made to focus on the propitious interna- 
tional environment in the country's evolution. First, we shall look at the 
historical conditions particular for the region at the time of Japan's opening 
to the world. Secondly, the paper will discuss the relationship which 
emerged between the postwar American project of restructuring the inter- 
national political economy on the one hand and the specific situation of 
Japan on the other. Lastly, to the extent that the original premisses on 
which US hegemony of the world capitalist system no longer obtain, con- 
jectures will be made as to the adjustment problems this gives rise to. Both 
external factors and the internal evolution project Japan as a major world 
actor as we approach the new millenium. 
The Transition to Modernity and the International 
Environment 
The comparative advantages of Japan around the middle of the nineteenth 
century were of a negative nature: Paucity of natural resources and poverty 
of the people. Weaknesses which acquired the quality of attributes by res- 
training Western interest. As the historian of precapitalist Japan, E.H. Nor- 
man, has put it: "In comparison to the attractions and profits of the 
Chinese market, Japan had very little to offer either as a market for foreign 
manufactures or as a granary of raw materials for Western industry.'I4 
Similarly, Western preoccupations with other areas of Asia such as In- 
donesia and China afforded Japan a certain respite. It was believed that the 
forceful opening of Japan would not be worth the effort. Under these cir- 
cumstances, the Tokugawa feudal regime avoided coming under the domi- 
nation of any imperialist power. The main source of Japanese anxiety dur- 
ing the first half of the nineteenth century was related to Russian 
ambitions. The geography factor, however, protected Japan from the 
Romanov Empire as the vast half-explored steppes of Siberia and the sea 
separated the two. Furthermore, as Russia became embroiled with Britain 
over the fate of Afghanistan and involvement in the Crimean War this 
land-based power's aspirations were correspondingly reducedS5 Inter- 
nally, the evolution of Japan during the years of seclusion had given the 
ruling classes a certain ideological uniformity and a disciplined 
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bureaucracy. The samurai caste gave Japan added ~ t r eng th .~  In addition, 
the population was relatively well educated with a high degree of cultural 
homogenity7 and a fairly developed basic infrastructure. 
The rulers of Japan had nevertheless good reasons to be alarmed at the in- 
creasing activity and creeping attention to their country on the part of for- 
eign navigators and empire-builders. Until the middle of the 1850s, the 
Russians made persistent but unsuccessful attempts to break Japan's 
seclusion. The first serious successes in nopeningcc Japan were made by the 
Russians and especially the Americans. At that time, however, the focus of 
interest was on China. Japan lay on the route to China for both powers.' 
The expedition by Commodore Matthew Perry (1853154) succeeded in 
forcing Japan to open its ports to American ships on their way to and from 
China for provisioning or repairs. Similar treaties were later signed with 
the Russians, the British, the French as well as other European powers.. 
The new arrival of the United States on the world scene and the growing 
rivalry between imperialist powers fulfilled the function of checks and 
balances on the freedom of action of each. Thus the leading nation, Bri- 
tain, was prevented from establishing exclusive rights in China and turn- 
ing the country into a colony as had been the case in India. It was also this 
international jealousy which made it difficult for any one Western nation 
to attempt a full-fledged conquest of Japan. This situation had a favorable 
impact on domestic Japanese developments. While intra-imperalist in- 
trigues and conflicts complicated the international climate it presented 
Japan with an interlude to put its house in order and thus avoid the fate of 
other non-European nations. The transition from feudalism to capitalism 
was hastened by the impact of the foreign menace, adding urgency to the 
Meiji Reformation which sought to overcome the weaknesses of Japanese 
society caused by disunity and social disintegration. As Norman put it: 
Taking advantage of this valuable breathing space, the Meiji 
leaders were able to destroy the feudal government of intrigue and 
dissension, setting up in its place a national, centralized govern- 
ment and opening Japan to the invigorating air of Western science 
and invention; and finally, through the foresight of this brilliant 
group of statesmen, the new regime laid the foundations for a 
strong independent nation thereby making invasion from abroad 
too dangerous or too uncertain an undertaking9 
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Although the disintegration of feudal Japan was due principally to in- 
ternal causes the evidence seems to indicate that the "opening" of the 
country following the imposition of unequal treaties contributed to ac- 
celerate the process of national integration and centralization of the society 
which is a precondition for capitalism. Fear of the West thus played a deci- 
sive role in an evolution which might otherwise have been longer and less 
intensive. On the ideological level, as Michio Morishima points out, a kind 
of ',defensive nationalism" as a salient feature of Japanese Confucianism 
had originated as early as the fifth and sixth centuries on the basis of 
awareness of the cultural disparity with China. With contact to Western 
countries a similar trend came into force.1° Comparing this situation to ex- 
amples where the transition to a modern society was held back, one may 
grasp the importance of the favorable circumstances Japan was offered by 
the fate of history. In the words of a French specialist: 
"There can be no doubt that Japan's success in economic and mili- 
tary terms especially when contrasted with the failures of China, 
Spain, Turkey, Persia and so on was to a considerable extent due 
to her rapid transformation into a unified nation-state."'* 
Rising Japanese capitalism was nevertheless threatened on the one 
hand by the unequal treaties which had forced Japan to accept the import 
of foreign goods and on the other hand by the country's lack of natural 
resources. The former "advantages" which had made Japan less attractive 
to the imperialist powers were dysfunctional to the development of in- 
digenous capitalism and resistance to foreign encroachment. These weak- 
nesses had to be overcome were Japan to industrialize and retain indepen- 
dence. Meiji leaders understood the dilemma and linked the two aspects 
together in the proposed project of Fokuko-kyohei, that is the creation of "a 
rich nation with strong armed forces1' In other words, a formula for a 
modern military system. In fact, driven by a strong sentiment of national- 
ism, the economic growth of the country became centrally directed with 
priority given to strategic industries such as iron, armament and ship- 
building. With the aim of resisting foreign competition the need for rapid 
development of an integrated industrial economy capable of supporting 
modern warfare was realized. In this connection gaining access to external 
natural resources was seen as a prerequisite and determinant for the role 
Japan was to play in East Asia. Geography (proximity) and history (the 
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unsettled situation in the area) made such a course possible. As Norman 
noted: "The leaders of Meiji Japan saw no reason to abstain from the 
scramble for the partition of China, and if economic pressure, a narrow 
home market and scarcity of essential raw materials are to be considered 
as justification, Japan had more of it than the other  power^."^' 
The struggle to become a recognized world power was successfully car- 
ried out. Its first consecration took place after the defeat of China during 
the 1894-95 war. Ostensibly the object of the conflict had been Chinese- 
Japanese disagreement over the fate of Korea, but the war equally fulfilled 
an internal function by galvanizing the energies of the nation in the direc- 
tion of favoring a greater role for Japan in the world. The frustration of the 
fruits of victory as a result of the so-called Triple Intervention (Russia, 
France, Germany) whereby Japan was forced to give up some of the con- 
cessions she had forced China to accept, resulted in making Japanese 
opinion hypersensistive to foreign intervention. Together with the gains 
made in spite of this interference -such as China's cession of Formosa and 
the Pescadores to Japan - it strengthened the hand of the political forces in 
favor of an active expansionist course. In geopolitical terms, the late- 
comer, Japan, now became an acknowledged member of the imperialist 
club. Thus Japanese troops participated in the suppression of the Boxer 
Uprising in China along with those of Western Powers. With the Anglo- 
Japanese Treaty of 1902, Japan was selected by Great Britain as the main 
bulwark against Imperialist Russia in Eastern Asia. The peace treaty of 
Porthsmouth, putting an end to the Russian-Japanese War (1904-05), es- 
tablished Japan as a major regional imperialist power. This conflict, as the 
Sino-Japanese War a decade earlier, was fought on Korean soil. This was a 
traumatic experience for the Korean nation and sealed its fate for the next 
forty years by linking it to the evolution of Japanese capitalism. Korea 
could no longer hope to play the imperialist powers against one another: 
China and Russia were now out of the picture. 
But of greater significance for later developments was that the victory 
fueled support in Japan for the course of pursuing military and foreign ex- 
pansion. An external factor pushing in the same direction was the inability 
or unwillingness of other powers to put a limit to Japanese ambitions. The 
opposite was in fact the case. Even before the end of the Russo-Japanese 
war, the American Secretary of War, William Howard Taft, had come to 
Tokyo in order to make a deal with Prime Minister Katsura. In exchange for 
American recognition of the seizure of Korea, the United States requested 
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and received Japanese acceptance for its acquisition of the Phillipines. This 
agreement was in flagrant contradiction to the treaty the United States had 
signed with the king of Korea in 1883 providing for mutual aid in case of 
foreign intervention. In the name of "Realpolitik" the United States for- 
feited its role as protector of Korea. A step which would leave the Korean 
nation a prey to Japanese imperialism.13 
Japanese colonialism in Korea and Taiwan was very intensive in compar- 
ison to the Western model. Although the role of the two colonies varied 
during different periods, their main functions were of a classical nature: 
that of supplying Japan with raw materials and foodstuffs while providing 
markets for Japanese manufactures as well as investments. Even though 
some industrialization did take place, especially in Korea, this was not un- 
related to the ambitions of Japan to expand on the mainland and reach out 
for Manchuria. In contrast to other colonial relationships, the short dis- 
tance between Japan and its colonies enabled the metropole to create a 
kind of regional political economy.14 Its primary organizational principle 
lay in fulfilling the needs of the metropole. There can be IittIe doubt that 
without the preconditions which colonialism was able to establish, such 
as access to cheap foodstuffs at critical moments, availability of a market 
when internal demand was slack, utilization of cheap labor and invest- 
ment opportunities when capital was in excess, the dynamics of Japanese 
industrial capitalism would have been different.15 
The colonies constituted a hinterland and a prerequisite for Japan's at- 
tempt to establish an exclusive Asian co-prosperity sphere in opposition to 
the West. The ideological attitude of the Japanese upper classes (nobility, 
middle and upper ranks of government and military, academics and Im- 
perial University students) toward the outside world was dictated by na- 
tionalist assertiveness and Pan-Asianism. As formulated by Michio Mori- 
shima: 
They came to feel sympathy for the nations of Asia, while at the 
same time despising them; increasingly they harboured a sense of 
obligation that Japan must take arms against Britain, America and 
other world powers in order to assist these Asian nations.16 
As such the project of liberating the area from Western encroachment was 
not one of anti- imperialism but one of counter-imperialism." In the event, 
the Western powers lost their colonies, but these in turn became sub- 
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jugated by a new master. The principal aim was the projection of Japanese 
military and economic power in Asia. 
The attempt to withdraw this area from the Western influence came into 
conflict with two forces: One was related to the aspirations of the local 
populations who under the influence of nationalism refused to accept this 
form of internationalism. The other was the refusal of the United States, 
the European colonial powers as well as Australia and New Zealand, to ac- 
cede to Japanese ambitions as these now threatened their own interests. 
In summary the accession of the only non-European nation to the rank 
of industrial imperialist power was the result of specific historical circum- 
stances which saved the country from becoming an object of colonialism. 
In order to avoid this fate the Japanese political elite used the "breathing 
space" efficiently for turning their nation into a leading imperialist con- 
tender prior to the Second World War. 
An American Dilemma: The Revival of Japan's Economy 
Defeat in the war closed one chapter while opening a new one in Japan's 
ascendancy toward economic leadership. In the following decades the fate 
of the country became closely intertwined with the hegemonic course of 
the United States. This nation, which prior to the war had been reluctant 
to involve itself actively in the management of the global political economy 
after the decline of Britain, now found itself to be the leader of world 
capitalism. Leadership meant responsibility not only for salvaging the sys- 
tem from immediate potential dangers caused by the socio-economic dis- 
ruptions of the war, but for creating an international political economy 
which could neutralize latent contradictions between the main capitalist 
actors. Elements within the political establishment realized that these con- 
flicts of interest in the 1930s had brought about the war. Under the impulse 
of American policy, friends and former foes were "moulded into a politi- 
cal and economic alliance while the former ally, the Soviet Union, became 
the adversary. 
This American course was a partial result of the change of administra- 
tion following the sudden death of the war-time president. With Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt at the helm, the US attitude had been characterized by 
a punitive approach toward the defeated Axis Powers and a benevolent 
predisposition toward the USSR. At the Teheran Conference (December 
1943), the American president had hinted to Joseph Stalin that the Soviet 
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Union could expect to be rewarded for eventual participation in the mili- 
tary defeat of Japan. During the war, the Soviet Union and Japan had ad- 
hered to a treaty of mutual neutrality. Now on the eve of victory of the anti- 
fascist coalition, Soviet interest lay in a return of the territories Tsarist Rus- 
sia had lost in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. There is evidence to suggest 
that as late as the Yalta Conference in February 1945 a secret understanding 
between Roosevelt and Stalin emerged whereby, as a quid pro quo for an 
early Soviet entry in the war against Japan, the United States would ac- 
quiesce in special Russian privileges in Manchuria as well as a return of the 
South Sakahlin and the Kuriles to the jurisdiction of the USSR.18 
Similar goodwill between the two leaders dominated with regard to the 
approaching defeat of Nazi Germany: the American president agreed to a 
Soviet request for German reparations of approximately twenty billion 
dollars. Understanding was reached on that occasion that this question 
would be settled once the apparatus for the administration of Germany 
had been put into place. 
President Roosevelt and his closest advisers had been working on the 
so-called Morgenthau Plan whose main intention was the transformation 
of Germany into a country with a "pastoral" economy unable to participate 
in future wars. A similar scheme was in the pipeline with regard to Japan. 
However, following the demise of Roosevelt and the dropping of the 
atomic bomb on Japan - with the purpose of keeping the USSR out of the 
administration of the defeated power -the basis of the Cold War was laid. 
Another contributing element was of course Soviet policy in Eastern Eu- 
rope. Under these circumstances, the influence of the faction within the 
American polity in favor of harsh punishment for the Axis Powers was giv- 
ing way to those favoring a rapid restoration of their economies. Another 
influentia1 factor was the realization that without recovery in Europe and 
Japan, sustaining these societies would entail significant American sacri- 
fices. 
The dilemma was the result of a complex set of circumstances. The other 
capitalist economies had been devastated or disorganized during the war 
and these countries were facing potential social disturbances. Shortages of 
food and raw materials as well as industrial goods could only be overcome 
through American deliveries. Without hard currency to pay for such sup- 
plies these countries were experiencing a "dollar gap." With the return of 
peace, the United States, whose production capability had been mobilized 
to the outmost during the conflict, soon had to cope with the question of 
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outlets once the domestic pent-up demand of the war years for consumer 
durables had been satisfied. US economic assistance to Europe (Marshall 
Plan) and to Japan (Economic Recovery in Occupied Areas) aimed at 
resolving both problems: foreign deficiencies and American surplus 
production capacity. As Richard J. Barnet writes with regard to the Mar- 
shall Plan, its reai significance "which helped change the face of Europe, 
was not that the Americans were either altruistic or self-serving - they 
were both -but that the survival of the economic system in the richest na- 
tion on earth was perceived to require a systemic transfer of reso~rces ."~~ 
The war had not only weakened the productive capacity of Europe and 
Japan, it affected the former external linkages which had permitted sus- 
tained industrial production. The European colonial powers were losing 
their "over-seas territories," while Germany's dependence on Eastern Eu- 
rope as a supplier of natural resources and markets was being shattered 
because of the division of Europe. The liberation struggle taking place in 
Asia following the defeat of the Japanese "Co-Prosperity Sphere" project 
did not permit optimism as to the rekindling of the economies of the 
metropoles on the basis of a return to colonialism. As seen from Washing- 
ton, rather than growing into centers of economic activity and recovery the 
areas of Europe, Asia and Japan seemed destined to become burdens on 
American "philanthropy" if not given access to earning the means to buy 
American goods. A course of benign neglect would have been politically 
prohibitive in the short and medium term. But assistance for the recovery 
of the other capitalist nations was bound sooner or later to translate into 
corresponding weakening of the position of the United States. 
At the time, the options were limited. In the immediate postwar years, 
American expenditures involved in sustaining Japan were reaching alarm- 
ing proportions. As a consequence the assistance program became geared 
to reestablishing the economic vitality of the country. It was felt that the 
revitalization of Japan would also contribute to improving the regional eco- 
nomic climate, the fate of Southeast Asia being another concern to US 
policy makers. Prior to the Second World War the area had been of impor- 
tance to both European and Japanese capitalism. Now the political mood 
in the region was one of nationalism and anti-imperialism. Under these 
circumstances, the Policy Planning Group under the leadership of the ar- 
chitect of containment toward the Soviet Union, George Kennan, planned 
to encourage moderate forces with the intention of establishing an interna- 
tional division of labor which would contribute to the functioning of the 
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economies of the allies in Europe and Japan. According to the group's 
recommendations, once the politics of the region had stabilized, the 
Unites States should vigorously seek to 
develop the economic interdependence between Southeast Asia as 
a supplier of raw materials, and Japan, Western Europe and India, 
as suppliers of finished goods, with due recognition, however, of 
the legitimate aspirations of Southeast Asian countries for some 
diversification of their economies.20 
The CIA concurred as to the significance for the United States of "retaining 
access to Southeast Asia for its own convenience and because of the great 
economic importance of that area to Western Europe and Japan."" 
The task of finding an harmonious equation whereby all would gain was 
not an easy one. In the US scheme, Southeast Asia was chosen as a kind 
of hinterland for Japan which would provide markets for textiles and other 
light industrial exports in exchange for raw materials thus alleviating the 
Japanese "dollar gap!' This policy, however, antagonized the old colonial 
powers in the region, Britain and France; nor did it satisfy the aspirations 
of the nationalist movements. They were prepared neither for a European 
return nor for the reintroduction of the Japanese. The course toward Japan 
to a certain extent soured Anglo- American relations, Although a member 
of the Occupation Powers, the British had not been given any say of impor- 
tance in the policy of reestablishing the Japanese economy. Britain's posi- 
tion had been split between fear of both recovery and collapse. It was felt 
that a dysfunctioning Japanese economy might deflect US resources from 
Europe and slow down the recovery of Southeast Asia, while a revitalized 
Japan might take a commanding position in the area. Not only was the 
region an important market, but its exports were providing significant 
earnings for England to help finance its trade deficit with the United 
States. American preoccupations with giving Japan the possibility of earn- 
ing dollars in what was considered a sterling area was seen as upgrading 
the strengthening of Japan at the expense of the interests of the British Em- 
pire." In addition, countries of the area such as Australia, New Zealand, 
the Philippines and China were apprehensive of US policy, fearing a 
stimulation of Japan's imperialist appetite. Among British cabinet mem- 
bers and Foreign Service officials, American policy appeared as a "strange 
neo-imperialism of a mystical and irrational k i n d  combined with a "drive 
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for exports which has acquired a certain force of de~peration."'~ 
Within Japan, the Occupation authorities turned monetary and trade 
policies in the direction of favoring Japanese exports. The American busi- 
ness experts in charge called for the end to the reparations Japan had been 
made to pay to its neighbors, as well as for the deconcentration of the econ- 
omy and the democratic reforms. In December 1948, Detroit banker, John 
Dodge, with experience in the administration of Germany's economic 
reconstruction, was appointed special ambassador to Japan. As the 
"Czar" of the Japanese economy, he was responsible for the so-called 
"Dodge line" which in essence resembled the German austerity program. 
A good portion of stringent neo-classical economics and central controls 
was applied, the intention being one of turning Japan into a low-cost big 
industrial exporter to Asian countries. As in the German case, the immedi- 
ate step was to reduce Japanese inflation and impose restrictions on con- 
sumption with priority given to building an export-oriented industry. The 
achievement of higher productivity was sought by reducing the number of 
non-competitive small and medium-size enterprises and keeping the 
wage level down through political means, i.e. the repression of organized 
labor. The resulting unemployment and social costs of this course were 
considered secondary to the goal of getting Japan to pay its way by becom- 
ing a large exporter2* 
Not unlike the policies of prewar Japan, the "Dodge line" favored large 
corporations in order to take advantage of economies of scale and the pro- 
motion of exports through competitive production costs in order to pene- 
trate the markets of Southeast Asia. Although American policy-making 
was dominated by liberals and free-traders, it is noteworthy that the Minis- 
try of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was set-up during the occu- 
pation in 1949, thereby giving an additional boost to a partnership of 
government and business. This alliance was a return to the Japanese 
model of industrial development characterized by state interventionism 
which has existed ever since the Meiji Restoration. In addition to these 
measures taken under the supervision of the Occupation Administration, 
the exchange value of the yen was established at the low rate of 360 to the 
dollar, thus giving Japan an additional trading advantage. 
The aim of American policy was not only the revival of the Japanese 
economy, but the creation of a regional political economic entity compris- 
ing the United States, Japan and Southeast Asia. The intention was to es- 
tablish a relationship of economic interdependence between the three 
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entities while providing, in the political sphere, a counterweight to Com- 
munism and the beginning "roll-back" of Soviet influence in the area. This 
construct, with the United States as the leading unit (core), Japan as the in- 
termediate zone (semi- periphery) and Southeast Asia as the hinterland 
(periphery) was conceived during deliberations of the National Security 
Council leading to Document NSC 48.25 
While Japan was looked upon as a potential junior economic partner in 
the region, supplying the material support for American policy in the Far 
East, the intention was not one of turning Japan into a competing center. 
The American assumption of responsibility for the fate of the defeated 
power consisted in giving Japan access to supplies of raw materials and 
markets for its production, that is, a kind of recreation of the old "Greater 
East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere!' But this did not imply that the United 
States would give up all means of leverage over Japanese developments. In 
1949, during a round table conference, Geoge I<ennan elaborated on the 
necessity of devising a formula which would fulfill these two aims: 
stimulating Japanese economic growth while keeping the former enemy 
subordinated to US interests. The key to making Japan prosperous eco- 
nomically and politically dependent was seen in maintaining the capabil- 
ity to apply pressure on the lifeline of Japan. That is the ability to excercise 
control over Japanese vital imports such as food, oil, etc. In the view of 
Kennan, by means of such an economic leash "we could have veto power 
over what she does.'lz6 
The Impact of the Korean War 
Notwithstanding the policies carried out by the Occupation in collabora- 
tion with the Japanese authorities to put the country on its feet again dur- 
ing the 1945-50 period, it was not until the Korean War that the economy 
began to show improvement. Politically, that conflict opened the possibil- 
ity of signing a peace treaty between the United States and Japan. With its 
signature in 1951 the Occupation administration came to an end. From the 
summer of 1950, Japan's industrial capacity became solidly harnessed to 
serve American policy in the region. Japan became the main supplier to 
the US war effort in Korea, thus resolving an otherwise huge problem of 
logistics. 
By subsidizing Japan's industrial rearmament, these procurements had 
a beneficial effect on the Japanese economy. The scope of the military 
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orders during 1951-52 reached nearly US$800 million per day. By the end 
of 1954 nearly US$3 billion had flown into Japan while for the rest of the 
1950s, funds from the new Mutual Security Program as well as the Foreign 
Operations Administration continued the stream of financial support for 
the Japanese economy. Furthermore, stable orders from the American 
military, together with technological transfer as well as assistance, permit- 
ted the spread of know-how to a large segment of the population while 
creating a favorable economic climate. As a student of this period of 
Japanese history points out: 
These expenditures not only helped balance the still chronic dollar 
gap and compensated for the barriers on trade with China, but 
they created for the first time since 1945 an assured market for 
heavy industrial and high technology exports for which no other 
customer existed.27 
At the outbreak of the Korean War, Japan's manufacturing output was a 
mere one-third of its 1931 while in 1951 industrial production ex- 
ceeded the prewar volume for the first timesz9 The importance of the in- 
jection of American money and technology together with the market thus 
created is recognized for the contribution it made to the "take off" of 
Japan's "economic miracle." Michael Schaller notes the importance 
ascribed to this conjunction by Japanese journalists reminiscing about this 
period in the 1970s. They acknowledged how "even today Japanese 
businessmen shudder at the thought of what might have happened if 
there had been no war in Korea at the time." The war-stimulated boom 
showed itself to be quite critical for subsequent growth and stabilization of 
the economy. The governor of the Bank of Japan went as far as to describe 
the procurement program as "Divine Aid.If3O 
The Korean War not only had a significant impact on Japan, but it con- 
tributed to shaping international developments. With the end of the Mar- 
shall Plan in June 1950, the capitalist world economy was finding itself in 
a kind of limbo. The Western European countries were suffering from stag- 
nation. In the United States, the Truman Administration was being frus- 
trated by a Congress unwilling to approve long-term assistance to Europe. 
Under the conditions of decreasing demand, the war resolved the 
dilemma by gearing Western economies to policies of rearmament. 
Although the trend had emerged through the climate created by the Cold 
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War, the Korean conflict exacerbated the tendency of increasing weapons 
production. As noted by G. and J. Kolko: ",..with astonishing swiftness 
(the war) wiped out the economic dilemmas and political restraints con- 
fronting Western capitalism during the preceding years.. lr31 
The impact of the war economy on the Western world was unequal with 
regard to economic benefits. For the United States, the resulting boom 
created by the conflict once again brought about some semblance of 
prosperity. For the defeated powers of World War 11, the Korean conflict 
contributed to their long-term accession to economic might. As Germany 
and Japan were resticted by their political status which did not allow rear- 
mament policies, they were able to concentrate on producing and export- 
ing non-military goods. 
American politicians recognized the significance of the war in the Far 
East for the state of the world economy. As Secretary of State Dean Ache- 
son put it, "Korea came along and saved US."~~A remark which reflected 
comprehension for the need to create sufficient demand for the productive 
capacity of the Western economies. The weakness of the global economic 
construct which the United States attempted to establish in the post-World 
War I1 era was related to these objective constraints. Indeed, the options at 
hand were limited. First priority had to be given to a return to near-normal 
conditions of Europe and Japan. The revival of their economies was a 
guarantee for the social sfatus quo and avoidance of political upheavals. It 
must be remembered that socialist forces were rather strong especially in 
European countries such as France and Italy. But also in Japan there was 
a trend within the labor movement against a return to prewar politics and 
against a pro- American posture. Another compelling influence on US 
room of maneuver was the dependence of American prosperity on the 
markets of those countries. Consequently, in order to give them the means 
to buy American goods in the short run, the United States had to contrib- 
ute to the rebirth of potential competitors in the longer run. 
The Question of Market: 
Absorption of Japanese Production 
Although access to raw materials was a major concern, it was the worries 
about outlets which came to dominate. As a by-product of the restoration 
of production at higher levels of productivity this problem was recognized 
as a source of difficulties at that time. Thus, prior to the outbreak of the 
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Korean War, Secretary of State Dean Acheson made the point that "more 
productive power" was now in existence "than there are markets to buy 
the stuff ."33 
The war in Asia to a certain extent alleviated the dilemma, but the Cold 
War and the "loss of China" worked in the opposite direction. Because of 
the embargo policy, whereby the United States attempted to restrain its al- 
lies from economic intercourse with the Soviet- bloc countries,34 the situa- 
tion became serious in the years following the Korean War. Prior to the con- 
flict, Japanese statesmen had shown awareness of the necessity of 
developing relations with the large Chinese neighbor. This inclination was 
based purely on "Real- okonomik"(!) Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida ex- 
pressed the essence of Japanese pragmatism to an American journalist in 
the spring of 1949: "I hate communism so much I avoid even reading about 
it;' but in the economic context, he did not "care whether China is red or 
green. China is a natural market, and it has become necessary for Japan to 
think about  market^."^' At the time, according to common understanding, 
political and business circles would, following a formal peace treaty with 
the United States, pressure the government to follow an independent 
regional policy not necessarily in accord with the objectives of the United 
States or the Soviet Union. The same year, the Japanese trade minister con- 
firmed such an intention by stating that Tokyo was hoping to conduct from 
one fourth to one third of its foreign trade with Mainland China. 
Influencing East Asian politics in this period was the American obses- 
sion with the China-issue. Not only had the country been "lost" to the 
communist revolutionaries, but US military forces had been humiliated on 
the Korean battlefield by the so-called "Chinese volunteersi' In the early 
1950s the Republican Party, dominated as it was by the active "China 
Lobby," was unrelentant in its determination to punish the "ungrateful" 
Chinese who had turned their backs on American philanthropy! Being a 
realist, Prime Minister Yoshida considered China as a part of Japan's econ- 
omy and held the opinion that the Chinese market would not be cut off 
eternally. The Japanese Prime Minister was no less ideologically disin- 
clined toward Communism than American politicians, but he did not be- 
lieve that a course of isolating China would contribute to the downfall of 
the regime and bring about the restoration of capitalism. Instead Yoshida 
favored a policy of integrating Mainland China into the regional economy. 
At US insistance however, Japan was forced under the CHINCOM secret 
agreement of 1952 to impose a stricter boycott of China than was the case 
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for members of the North Atlantic Treaty O~ganization.~~ 
The restoration of Japan's sovereignty through the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty together with the armistice in Korea did not resolve the impasse of 
American policy in the area. The fear that an independent Japan might, in 
one way or another, reestablish links with the Chinese regime on the main- 
land led to a US policy of military isolation of China as well. The American 
attitude was also at odds with the other members of the Western alliance. 
Both the European countries and Japan resented the US-imposed restric- 
tions on trade with China. The British, especially, eager to deflect Japanese 
commerce from the Sterling-bloc area in Southeast Asia, viewed the 
China-question differently than the Americans. The Japanese as well were 
much more interested in trading with both China and the West in order to 
acquire hard currency, rather than relying on the countertrade arrange- 
ments between Japan and the region which the United States hoped to es- 
tablish. Of influence was the fact that Japanese goods in the 1950s and 
1960s were considered to be of inferior quality and uncompetitive in the 
West. Japan was regarded as incapable of producing marketable exports. 
This was the gist of the message Secretary of State John Foster Dulles gave 
Prime Minister Yoshida in the summer of 1954: Do not place too much 
hope on the American market because "the Japanese don't make the 
things we want." Instead Dulles suggested that Japan find outlets else- 
where, i.e, in the developing world, especially in Southeast Asia.37 
These circumstances explain the reluctance of Japanese politicians to fol- 
low the policy of the United States on the issue of the China-embargo. 
Another source of discordance was related to the US change of heart on 
the question of defense capability. At the instigation of General MacAr- 
thur, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution had prohibited Japan from en- 
gaging in armament production and war preparations. This measure had 
been in conformity with the upsurge of Japanese pacifism following World 
War 11. But very soon thereafter, the American position shifted toward a 
reversal. During a visit to Japan in 1953, Vice-president Richard Nixon 
publicly declared that the MacArthur contribution to the constitution, the 
anti-war provision, had been an error. 
As seen by the Eisenhower Administration, the strategy of keeping 
Japan within the orbit of the West depended on two elements. Namely, 
trade issues and the defense question with the latter as the key link. Mili- 
tary buildup was seen as a method of mobilizing a certain amount of 
Japanese industrial production while opening the way for Japan to share 
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in the burden of keeping law and order in the region. But rearmament on 
the scale demanded by the American side was resisted by the Japanese 
government, on the ground that because of domestic pacifist opinion this 
would not be possible. Such an evolution, Prime Minister Yoshida main- 
tained, would have to come about as the result of a gradual process. 
The question of trade was equally difficult to handle. In Washington, 
the mood was changing with the awareness of the limits of the power and 
capability of the United States to shape a world economy which could be 
advantageous to both the allies and to American interests. Concern with 
budget balancing - leading to a reduction of foreign assistance - as well as 
the fear of competition from Japanese and European producers were be- 
ginning to make themselves felt. Simultaneously, the US position of an- 
tagonism toward China prevented Japan from trading with the Com- 
munist regime. President Eisenhower recognized some of the contradic- 
tory aspects of a policy based on the above considerations. In his opinion, 
its application could yield short-term advantages but in the longer term 
might prove to be counterproductive; that is, the creation of a situation in 
Asia which American strategy was trying to prevent from arising: the loss 
of Japan. Under these circumstances finding outlets for Japanese exports 
was an issue of paramount importance. In the words of President Eisen- 
hower during a press conference in 1954: 
Japan cannot live and Japan cannot remain in the free world un- 
less something is done to allow her to make a living. Now, if we 
will not give her money, if we will not trade with her, if we will 
not allow her to trade with the Reds . . . what is to happen to 
Japan? It is going to the  communist^.^^ 
Disagreement on this issue existed at the highest level of the American 
administration. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles favored the opening 
of the US market to Japanese exports in order to reduce Japan's interest in 
the China connection, while the president, fearing a flooding of the coun- 
try with Japanese goods, held an opposite view. During a cabinet meeting 
in August 1954, President Eisenhower argued that Japan ought to engage 
in trade with neighboring communist areas. This would in his opinion also 
serve to weaken the socialist system: 
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If China, for example, finds that it can buy cheap straw hats, 
cheap cotton shirts, sneakers, bicycles, and all the rest of that sort 
of stuff from Japan it would seem to me that that would set up the 
need within China for the dependence upon Japan . . . Anyone 
who say that to trade with a Red country is in effect advocating a 
traitorous act just dosn't know what he is talking about.39 
Japanese access to the Chinese market did not materialize until the com- 
plete reversal of US policy in Asia following the defeat in Indochina. In the 
second half of the 1940s and in the 1950s, the United States, notwithstand- 
ing its commitment to an open world economy under the banner of free 
trade, was not disposed to accept Japanese commerce with China. In- 
stead, Washington acted as Japan's broker in Europe. The logic being that 
if the Japanese could not find takers for their wares in European countries, 
their cheap products would flood the United States and there would be lit- 
tle chance of keeping them at bay from the Chinese markets in the longer 
run. In part, this problem of Japanese competition had been self-inflicted. 
Apart frombanning Japan from the Chinese market, the United States had 
shown, from the early postwar years, a great degree of permissiveness 
toward Japan's use of discriminating practices and tight control of eco- 
nomic exchanges. In essence these measures were similar to those that had 
characterized Japan's foreign economic relations prior to World War 11. As 
Richard Barnet puts it: 
Even as she was being initiated in the US designed free-trade sys- 
tem for the capitalist world, Japan was developing the mercantilist 
approach that would bring her extraordinary returns. The state 
guided international trade, limiting imports to the barest essentials 
and subsidizing exports, just as in the prewar period.40 
Indeed the Japanese economy under American aegis was able to show 
remarkable successes. With a higher growth rate than Germany, Japan ac- 
quired an industrial capacity beyond and above internal demand. Accen- 
tuating this trend, domestic policies and the cultural background did not 
encourage consumerism to the same extent as in Western societies. The 
country was thus able to institutionalize a substantial rate of internal sav- 
ings and investments leading to productivity increases. 
As the same author notes, the Japanese were taking the game of eco- 
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nomics very seriously and applying the lessons which American policies 
had introduced. Determined to catch up and come out of the bind which 
defeat had meant, there was little flinching: 
For the Japanese, like the Germans, the world trade competition, a 
deadly serious business, was also a morality play. Should not the 
followers of Benjamin Franklin's precept benefit from their indus- 
try? Had not the United States during the occupation taught those 
values even if it had forgotten them.41 
Besides the advantages of being an economic prot4g4 of the United 
States, American security protection together with the militarization of 
Taiwan and especially South Korea saved Japan from the burden of a 
defense effort.42 Japan's strong economic performance and the relatively 
weak militarization of its economy meant that the country was not encum- 
bered to the same degree by non-productive waste of resources as was the 
case for others. It has been estimated that had Japan from 1954 to 1974, like 
the United States, used 6 to 7 percent of its Gross National Product on 
defense, the size of its economy in 1974 would have been 30 percent 
smaller.43 It was not until the middle of the 1980s that military spending in 
Japan creeped slightly above 1 per cent of GNP. Nevertheless, it is expected 
that Japan may soon become the fourth biggest military spender in the 
world after the U.S., the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. 
Perspectives: Adapting to Post-American Hegemony 
With hindsight, the case can be made that US policy toward Japan and East 
Asia in general contributed to turning Japan into the problem-child of the 
present world economy. It is ironical that even prior to the official sur- 
render, Japanese business leaders rejoiced at the prospect of the United 
States assuming responsibility for the future evolution of Japan. One such 
personality, Fujiyama Aiichiro, later to become foreign minister, reminisc- 
ing about this period, recalls that upon learning who the occupying power 
would be "many industrialists uncorked their champagne bottles and 
toasted the coming of a new industrialist era."44 
In a similar vein, the country's first postwar prime minister, Shigeru 
Yoshida, recognized the advantage of political and economic subjugation 
to the United States. In contrast to those favoring neutrality and object- 
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ing to US domination, he half-jokingly reminded an American Embassy 
official of the analogy between his country's situation with regard to the 
United States and that of the American colonies' subordination to British 
colonialism. Like the Americans who later became the hegemonic power 
of the Atlantic Community, he remarked sarcastically, "if Japan becomes a 
colony of the United States, it will eventually become the ~tronger."~' 
That the United States has now become weaker is an accepted fact. The 
world capitalist system has since the 1970s been suffering from economic 
difficulties created in essence by the increasing competition between the 
United States and its political allies. In retrospect, it can be said that the US 
scheme of establishing a new international order based on its hegemony 
but advantageous to all members of the Western alliance was bound to be 
illusory. Uneven development between the different leading nations 
would eventually lead to the ascendancy of those that were best able to ad- 
just their society to the opportunities of the international system. The 
American project rather than retard the process perhaps accelerated it. 
The relationship which the United States attempted to establish com- 
prised multifarious aspects which would eventually undermine it. 
The security dimension, with time, became a significant element behind 
the economic problems which arose. While spending much of its 
resources and energy on military preparations in the confrontation with 
the Soviet Union, during the Cold War and the "hot wars" on the Asian 
continent as well as policing the rest of the world, the United States was in 
fact exhausting itself. In the meantime, this global politico-military 
posture alleviated the defence concerns of the allies as well as resolving 
somewhat the absorption problem of the world capitalist economy as the 
American market became the largest in the world. Simultaneously, US 
corporations took advantage of the extraordinary opportunities abroad by 
investing in foreign countries often with the aim of exporting the final 
products to the United States. This further weakened the competitive po- 
sition of the United States. 
These elements in combination with American international economic 
policies and aid programs were crucial to the so-called golden age of 
capitalism. A period characterized by the boom in world trade and capital 
flows during the 1950s and 1960s. From the present perspective of the 
United States, the course followed may have been too successful for its 
own good. As a student of US-Japanese economic relations put it: "One of 
the most serious weaknesses in the postwar international economic order 
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was the failure to foresee, recognize and adjust to the unexpectedly rapid 
increase in Japanese and European industrial competitiveness relative to 
the United States."46 
By the early 1970s, the United States experienced the first foreign trade 
deficit in a century. The 'American Challenge," although not entirely a 
"paper tiger," was revealing itself to be less of a threat than some would 
have had the world believe.47 The world economy, under US dominance 
until then, was increasingly being challenged by European and Japanese 
conter,ders. Their comparative advantages were the result of lower 
production costs and higher productivity besides not having to contend 
directly with the burdens of being the international gendarme. Awareness 
of this evolution in the West-West balance of forces has, in recent years, giv- 
ing rise to a period of American self-doubt. Richard Barnet notices a 
qualitative change in the US political mood toward allies as 
the familiar underpinnings of a world that could be benevolently 
managed from Washington were crumbling. Now, in the midst of 
the Vietnam tragedy, the Japanese who had been part of the back- 
drop of world politics, suddenly became visible, and their appear- 
ance on center stage produced a certain panic in W a s h i n g t ~ n . ~ ~  
The point to understand with regard to the American project of revitaliz- 
ing the other capitalist nations after World War I1 is that there was no viable 
alternative. Having rejected President Roosevelt's vision of a Soviet- 
American condominium to run the world49 which would have been to the 
detriment of Europe and Japan, postwar US politicians chose the opposite 
course: rehabilitation of the other capitalist powers and antagonism 
towards the Soviet Union. In one of his last writings in 1952, Joseph Stalin 
predicted a dialectical shift in the West-West relati~nship.~' While ortho- 
doxically emphazising the "oppressive" character of American domina- 
tion on its allies, he was oblivious to the fact that  benevolence" of the 
United States toward former enemies and friends was actually contribut- 
ing to the contradictions which would eventually emerge. 
Compared with earlier examples of international hegemony, the United 
States altered the functioning of such a relationship. The American res- 
tructuring of the world political economy after the Second World War did 
contain hegemonic aspects of domination. But at the same time US policy 
offered opportunities to the other actors. As Bruce Cumings has noted: 
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"The very breadth of this international system - its non-territoriality, its 
universalism, and its open systems (within the grand area) - made for a 
style of hegemony that was more open than previous imperialisms to com- 
petition from below."51 
Perhaps better than any other nation within the Western alliance Japan 
was able to adjust to opportunities available. The country had historical ex- 
perience to build on. It will be recalled that ever since the Meiji Restora- 
tion, Japan had shown a profound understanding of the workings of the 
international system. In its relationship to the outside Japan can be said to 
have gone through four phases: 1) resistance to the opening of the country 
by the West followed by selective imports of technology and other know- 
how; 2) an expansionist or imperialist period in an attempt to colonize East 
and Southeast Asia, thus challenging the West on its own turf; 3) partici- 
pation in the Second World War which signified its first defeat in the world 
system since its ascendancy; 4) postwar reconstruction and establishing it- 
self as an economic superpower. 
The outcome of the last phase is uncertain and the question of quo vadis 
gives cause to worries both inside and outside Japan. The nation finds it- 
self at the end of three intertwined epochs: 1) the end of the exceptionally 
rapid postwar economic growth; 2) the decline of the American 
hegemonic position; and 3) the completion of a process which took less 
than one and a half century: "catching up with the West." This goal has 
been a driving force of Japanese nationalism. During this evolution Japan 
could selectively choose Western technology and other practices; and it 
had a model to emulate. This does not mean that Japanese society which 
emerged through modernization was a simple replica of the West. But in 
the present situation, where the nation has reached the highest economic 
and technological levels, Japanese society will have to innovate. Given its 
integration in the world economy, the Japan which will merge in the com- 
ing decades will remain internationalist. As two analysts of that country 
conclude: "Catching-up does not imply that Japan will henceforth become 
inward-looking. It is simply that Japan perceives that it must now find its 
own way in a highly interdependent world as the new era ~ n f o l d s . " ~ ~  
Although Japan is presently an important actor in the world economy, its 
weight in the international community in the cultural and political sphere 
is limited. Although an economic giant, Japan is still a political dwarf! In 
this respect, should the country want to play an increasing world role it 
may have to develop a corresponding internationalist ideology. Japan's 
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main ideological motivation in the modern era has been a kind of "defen- 
sive Nationalism for the sake of survival" based on Confucianism and 
Shintoismj3 but lacking universal appeal. In practice, however, the defen- 
sive nationalism of Japan turned into aggressiveness in the process of 
catching up with the West. As a result its "Pan-Asianism" in the 1930s did 
not call forth a sympathetic response from Asians nor did many Japanese 
believe in it. As Johan Galtung points put: 
The n~tionalism implicit in Shinto not only defines Japan as a center, but 
also the rest of the world, easily as a resource - very different from the cor- 
responding mix in China that certainly defines China as a center, but the 
rest of the world more as barbarianss4 
Although this culturalist approach might lead to wrong conclusions about 
Japan's ability to play an international role, the argument can nevertheless 
be made that because of this lack of universalism, Japan compares un- 
favorably with other world players. In the contemporary epoch, for exam- 
ple, the Western leading nations project the principles of democracy and 
Christianity, the Soviet Union uses Marxism-Leninism, while Arab na- 
tions refer to Islam. Regardless of the fact that this may be rhetorical such 
ideological discourse does have an internal as well as an external function. 
Without an ideology of universal quality, Japan can easily be accused of 
conducting foreign economic relations exclusively in the pursuit of selfish 
ends. There might be envy of Japan's acquired status and wealth, but it is 
questionable whether this is accompanied by admiration or real trust in 
Japan as a leader. As a French scholar put it "the Japanese have no natural 
friends, no natural allies."55 But on the other hand who has! 
This does not mean however that the outside world remains immune to 
Japan's macro- and microeconomic successes. In the beginning of the 
1980s there has been a kind of "Japanolatry" to use the expression coined 
by Ronald D ~ r e . ~ ~  Industrial policy has become a subject of studies with 
some economists suggesting that the United States ought to emulate the 
Japanese.j7 Similarly Japanese management techniques have become a 
source of interest in Amer i~a .~ '  
Nearer at home, in the East Asian region, the Japanese example exerted 
a significant influence on the political economies of the four "japoncitos" 
or Japan's Japans as Johan Galtung calls the four East Asian NICs. Simi- 
larly ASEAN countries have attempted to adopt the so-called "look East" 
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economic strategies in order to learn from the Japanese case. 
But until recently, Japan has not tried to establish its hegemony in the 
Western sense. As Galtung puts it: 
Japan apparently practices a purely economic imperialism, not trying to 
make other countries into political, military and cultural peripheries 
through client formation in general, bases and alliance patterns, and cul- 
tural penetration - thereby looking more innocuous, less like a massive 
threat to local autonomy.59 
There is no doubt that Japanese decision-makers are also aware of the im- 
pression Japan made during the colonial epoch and the earlier attempt at 
creating a sphere of influence in the area. 
Of more determining importance to Japan's future world role will be the 
shape of US-Japanese ties as this relationship will be affected by the evolu- 
tion of their internal situations as well as their respective national interests. 
It has been stated that the tie between the two countries is characterized by 
economic interdependence (and rivalry) and mutual dependence on the 
security plan. But the question is whether the partnership can survive a 
continuation of this type of economic and strategic relation~hip.~~ These 
relations between the two countries instead of being part of the solution 
are in fact part of the problem. In essence, the Japanese-American relation- 
ship since the Second World War was based on the acceptance by both 
countries of the stabilizing influence of American dominance. 
It is the axiom of the theory of "hegemonic stability" (Kindleberger, Gil- 
pin) that in order to avoid anarchy, the international system needs a 
predominant power to provide the economic, political and military back- 
ing for the capitalist order. Among core-nations, the hegemon defends the 
rules of international intercourse by allowing its national currency to be 
used as the standard of exchange as well as keeping its domestic market 
open. According to this school of political economy, it was precisely the 
breakdown of Pax Britannica, with no willing or able replacement to British 
hegemony, which led to the anarchy of the 1930s and the resulting conflict 
between the members of the international community Aware of the hor- 
rendous disorder which the last hegemonic turnover brought in its wake 
before stability was again obtained under American dominance, so- 
me analysts have launched the idea of a dual US-Japanese condomi- 
nium to manage the present unstable world system. A former MITI 
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official has suggested a "Pax Ameripponica" based on a corporation model 
with the United States serving as president and Japan as vice-predi- 
dent.The American magazine Time seems to prefer the neologism "Pax 
Amerinippon" with a division of labor entailing Japan functioning as the 
world's banker and the United States as its policeman. 
The Japan-scholar John W. Dower who discusses this scenario considers 
such a construction as being out of touch with reality because of the politi- 
cal and psychological problems involved: 
For the United States and Japan to institute even a diluted version 
of this Draconian agenda would require governments committed 
to serious structural reform and capable of marshaling a consensus 
in both the private and public sectors. No one really believes this is 
possible in either country.61 
At present the United States and Japan are, for different reasons, 
destabilizing factors in the world economy. In order to reestablish some 
form of coherence in their relationship, both societies would have to 
change their ways of doing things. While Americans spend more than they 
produce, the reverse is the case for the Japanese. Thus Americans would 
have to consume less, export more and save more. Japanese, on the other 
fiand, should produce less, export less, save less and consume more. On 
the macroeconomic level, the United States should give up  adherence to 
the "invisible h a n d  and go over to some form of industrial policy in some 
sectors. Japan ought to abandon the "plan rationality" (Chalmers Johnson) 
of state interventionism in industrial policy and go over to embracing 
Adam Smith. The United States would have to regain superiority in high 
technology for strategic purposes while Japan would have to share such 
technology. Furthermore, for interdependence to turn into real coordina- 
tion between the United States and Japan, they would have to accept a 
bilateral currency and mutually compatible tax systems. Chalmers John- 
son insists that such ideas belong to the realm of "economic fiction."62 
At present, the United States is taking initiatives to limit Japanese gains 
on the American market while "Japan-bashing" in the media and among 
academics has gained acceptability because, among other things, of the so- 
called "free-ride" as far as the discrepancy in defense efforts is concerned. 
How far can the American side push Japan to change its winning formula 
in world economic competition without altering qualitively the partner- 
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ship and rekindling anti-Western nationalism? Such tendencies are 
present in Japanese society and due to the difficulties the governing 
Liberal Democratic Party has been facing the trend has even been rein- 
forced. As the New YorkTimes correspondent in Tokyo writing in the sum- 
mer of 1989 put it: "Until recently, such nationalistic themes have usually 
been voiced only on the far left and right of Japanese politics. But now, in 
the midst of Japan's biggest upheaval in 35 years, a growing impatience 
with the United States is bubbling to the surface of mainstream political 
discu~sion."~~ The tendency to say "nor' to the United States is thus be- 
coming part of the Japanese political discourse and 'America-bashing" is 
a popular topic for prominent writers who find readily access to popular 
 publication^.^^ 
There is no doubt that the disharmonious state of the US-Japanese con- 
nection is having an impact on Japan. Equally important, though, are the 
tendencies in the world economy which are a source of worry for the 
Japanese elite. The growth of protectionism and the potential disintegra- 
tion of free trade are seen in the creation of the Single European Market af- 
ter 1992 and the United States-Canada free trade agreement. Prospects of 
a "European Fortress" and "North American Stockade" are taken seri- 
ously in Japan. It is a paradox of contemporary capitalism that while the in- 
ternationalization of capital and production is taking place a trend toward 
cartelization of trade is simultaneously emerging. Confronted with the Or- 
wellian scenario of bloc confrontation, the Japanese - besides internation- 
alizing their economy by investing in Europe and North America - are like- 
wise pursuing the aim of establishing a "Yen Bloc" in East Asia. The 
countries of the region are being submitted to a pull and push effect. Feel- 
ing attracted by the economic dynamism of Japan and rejected by the 
creeping protectionism of the Western capitalist world, Asian countries 
seem to be reluctantly willing to accept Japanese leadership in the integra- 
tion of the region. As the Economist put it in a survey of the area, Japan is 
the key: 
When the geese migrate, they fly in a V-formation. The pattern is a 
favorite analogy of Japanese civil servants for the economic de- 
velopment of East and Southeast Asia. Japan leads. Behind it fol- 
lows the NICs. In the third rank are the new NICs and coastal 
China. As with flying geese, the arrangement is purposeful, well- 
ordered and co-~rdinated.~~ 
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It is not uninteresting to note that Australia is pushing in the same direc- 
tion. While not disagreeing with the prospect of a replay of the Asian co- 
prosperity scheme as a most plausible option for Japan, the American 
economist Rudiger Dornbusch, extrapolating from the economic strength 
of Japan, reaches the conclusion that in its search for more substantial out- 
lets for investment, technology and capital goods, Japan will find a willing 
taker in Mikail Gorbachev's USSR. There is potential compability between 
the two economies as strong as the one present in the US-Japanese part- 
nership: 
In the coming era of mercantilism, money and markets count 
most. The Soviet Union and Japan can derive great benefits from 
commercial alliance: One has natural resources and untapped 
markets, the other has technology and capital; one wants to save, 
the other needs to spend. The Soviet Union and Japan are as 
natural a future match as America and Japan are a current match.66 
The American economist may be overstating his case in an attempt to call 
attention to the disorder Japan's economic succes is creating for the rest of 
the world. But the reduction of East-West tension will further decrease the 
need for US strategic protection and might give Japan greater freedom of 
movement with regard to the Soviet Union. 
In the zero-sum game of uneven capitalist development, Japan's gains 
amount to other countries' losses. This creates unrest for the entire system 
as well as for the individual members of the international community. The 
way Japan will adjust to the new political order is bound to open a new 
chapter in the country's relationship to the outside world. But of equal im- 
portance will be how the rest of the world perceives Japan's role. 
The dialectics, national and international, which had such importance 
in Japan's ascension still operate. Until now the country has benefitted 
fromits ties to the United States and the capitalist world system. A number 
of American and Japanese decision- makers would probably favor a return 
to the former state of the relationship: that is the stability created by Ameri- 
can hegemony as it manifested itself before the beginning of the 1970s. The 
dilemma, however, is that the task of looking after all the parts of the whole 
system no longer is within the range of the capability of the United States. 
Consequently, the conjunction of American decline and Japanese ascen- 
sion is an unsettling element for their bilateral relations as well as for the 
rest of the world. 
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